Today I e-filed a consolidated position statement and umbrella memorandum with the National Labor Relations Board, Region 32, in support of all ten of my pending unfair labor practice charges against Apple Inc. (Case Nos. 32-CA-381277, -381430, -381499, -381754, -381967, -382501, -382742, -383738, -384065, and -384770). The filing consolidates what has, until now, been told in ten separate charge cover letters into a single account — because it was always a single course of conduct.

In April 2025, Apple signed a national settlement agreement with the NLRB (Case 32-CA-284428). In it, Apple promised to rescind and stop enforcing the overbroad confidentiality rules it had used against employees — including me — to the extent those rules covered wages, hours, and working conditions. The settlement includes a self-executing default provision: if Apple violates it and doesn't cure within fourteen days of notice, the original complaint is reissued, Apple's answer is deemed withdrawn, every allegation is deemed admitted, and the Board can enter a full remedy without a trial.

Within months of signing, Apple rebuilt the same restrictions through a different vehicle: the confidentiality-designation mechanism of a protective order in my civil retaliation lawsuit. At my December 2025 deposition, the moment I invoked the NLRB settlement on the record, Apple's counsel declared everything I said going forward "confidential" — ultimately about 72% of my testimony about my own working conditions and my own complaints.

What followed, between February and April 2026, was a coordinated enforcement campaign by three of Apple's outside law firms across three federal forums: demands that I delete published posts and commit to future silence; a letter banning me from every Apple property on Earth, forever (walked back to a single address one day after I filed a charge about it); motions seeking sanctions, gag orders, and the sealing of my NLRB charges from the public docket; and threats of sanctions and pre-filing restrictions in my own Chapter 7 bankruptcy case — with my NLRB charges expressly listed, by name, as the supposedly "vexatious" conduct justifying it all.

Then the district court ratified the mechanism. In June 2026, it granted Apple's motion to retain its confidentiality designations, kept seventeen entire docket entries under seal — including my NLRB charges and the NLRB settlement agreement itself — and ordered me to "de-publish" my own already-published speech about my own working conditions, along with "all other publications and republications of that same material." In July, the district judge personally ordered my compliance. And in August, Apple took the position that the orders are now final and unreviewable: the district court supposedly can't revisit them because they're on appeal, Apple "reserves its right to object" to the Ninth Circuit reviewing them, and my request that Apple state the factual and legal basis for each individual redaction is, in Apple's words, impermissible "relitigation." Apple alone decides what is secret, and no tribunal may ask why.

The NLRB does not answer to the district court on questions of federal labor law — it's the other way around. Under San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, whether an employer may restrict employee speech about working conditions, and whether it may retaliate against an employee for filing Board charges, are questions committed exclusively to the Board. The district court never applied the National Labor Relations Act; it applied Rule 26(c), a discovery rule. Board decisions are reviewed by the federal courts of appeals — not by district-court discovery orders.
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And under Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB and BE&K Construction v. NLRB, an employer's litigation loses any petitioning protection when it pursues an objective that is illegal under federal law — enforcing restrictions a Board settlement rescinded, punishing an employee for filing charges, imposing gag terms the Board has held unlawful even to propose, sealing Board charges from public view, and disabling an employee's ability to participate in Board proceedings. That exception applies regardless of whether the employer wins in court. No judicial success can launder an unlawful objective. So Apple's court victories are not a defense to these charges. They are the evidence — the measure of how far the mechanism got before anyone with jurisdiction over the labor question weighed in.

The filing asks Region 32 to:

• Invoke the settlement's default provision — issue the fourteen-day non-compliance notice, and if Apple doesn't cure, reissue the October 2024 complaint with all allegations deemed admitted, as Apple agreed in writing;
• Issue a consolidated complaint on all ten charges;
• Seek a Section 10(j) injunction so that Apple cannot keep enforcing the designations, deletion demands, and sealing positions against my protected activity — or my ability to give evidence to the Board — while the case is decided;
• Order the remedies the Board imposed in Pain Relief Centers: withdrawal of every litigation position with a preempted or unlawful objective, and reimbursement of the costs of defending against them; and
• Order rescission and notice — including notifying the district court and the Ninth Circuit that the designations and related orders were procured and enforced in violation of the Act and the settlement.

If this mechanism stands, every NLRB settlement in the country is optional. Any employer can sign one, then obtain a protective order in any lawsuit with any employee, designate the employee's testimony about her working conditions as "confidential," treat her Board charges as violations of that designation, get the charges sealed, get her speech deleted, and then administer the whole regime from behind a wall of "finality" that it claims no court can look past. The confidentiality rules the Board ordered rescinded come back — this time backed by the contempt power of a federal court.

The Supreme Court said in Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission that Congress wants people with information about unfair labor practices to be "completely free from coercion against reporting them to the Board." That principle either means something or it doesn't. This filing asks the Board to say it does.

My appeals are pending in the Ninth Circuit: one from the June 2026 judgment, and a second (No. 26-5331) from the confidentiality, sealing, and de-publication orders, with my opening brief due November 6, 2026. The Board's process runs independently of both — which is exactly the point. Nearly a year will have passed between the deposition gag and the first appellate briefing. The Board doesn't have to wait, and its own settlement gives it a remedy that requires no new trial at all.
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The full consolidated position statement is available below.

- Ashley Gjovik 

Case update: Gjovik v. Apple Inc., N.D. Cal. No. 3:23-cv-04597-EMC; Ninth Circuit appeals pending. Everything discussed below comes from the public docket, which you can read for yourself on CourtListener. The views here are mine — I'm the plaintiff, and these are some of the arguments I am making on appeal.
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The district court case ended with a judgment on June 24, 2026 (Dkt. 390), which is now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. But a second dispute — about secrecy itself — kept going after the judgment, and it has now produced its own appeal (Ninth Circuit No. 26-5331). That dispute is about whether hundreds of pages of my court filings, largely describing my complaints about my working conditions at Apple, can be sealed from public view, and whether I can be ordered to "de-publish" my own speech about my own case.

Here's the short version of how we got here, all from the public docket:

• In early 2026, Apple moved to seal roughly twenty of the filings in the case — including oppositions, declarations, and even a Request for Judicial Notice consisting of public records (Dkt. 340). The documents were sealed in their entirety, provisionally, in April (Dkt. 355).
• After the case was already over, a magistrate judge granted Apple's motion to keep its confidentiality designations (Dkt. 396, June 29, 2026). That order also directed that the previously sealed filings "remain sealed," and ordered me to "de-publish" material.
• The order's entire description of what is actually confidential is a single category: my deposition testimony about Apple's "internal code words and descriptions of internal product-related studies." (Dkt. 396 at 6.) It does not identify which portions of which documents contain that information.
• The district judge declined to disturb that ruling (Dkt. 398, July 16, 2026) — but, notably, ordered the parties to meet and confer about applying "limited redactions" to the sealed filings, because even Apple had told the court that entire documents should not stay sealed.
• I appealed. Twice, protectively, to make sure nothing slipped through a procedural crack (Dkt. 399, Dkt. 403).

So as of today the filings remain 100% sealed, months after a court acknowledged only "limited redactions" were warranted, and the question of what the public gets to see is being worked out — if you can call it that — in a "meet and confer" process between me and the company that wanted the secrecy in the first place.

Follow the sequence, because each step is stranger than the last.

Step one: seal first, specify never. Sealing a court record is supposed to work in exactly one order of operations. The party who wants secrecy identifies the specific content, explains with particularity why each piece meets the demanding legal standard, and the court makes specific findings before anything is sealed. That's not my preference — it's the Ninth Circuit's rule and this district's own Local Rule 79-5, which requires sealing requests to be "narrowly tailored" to sealable material, identified item by item. Here, entire documents were sealed wholesale, and the operative order defines the confidential content only as a one-sentence category.

Step two: the company that demanded secrecy can't find it. When the court ordered the "limited redactions" process, Apple — the party that filed the sealing motions, supported by sworn declarations — reported that it needed weeks to conduct a "careful and diligent review of nearly 1,000 pages" to locate the confidential information. Sit with that. The confidential content that justified sealing a thousand pages was, by Apple's own account, so hard to find that Apple itself needed a month-long expedition to locate it — months after it swore the documents warranted sealing.

Step three: the redactions arrive with no explanations. What Apple eventually produced was a set of highlighted pages. No index. No indication of which highlights quote the designated testimony and which are "indirect references" (Apple's phrase). No explanation of how any particular highlight falls within the one-sentence category. When I asked for a per-redaction basis — the kind of itemized chart this district ordinarily requires for any sealing request — Apple refused, and told me the burden was on me to identify each redaction I disputed and justify my disagreement, after which, in Apple's own words, "Apple will then consider your response before making a final decision about whether to retain or remove the redaction."

Read that again. In a dispute about the public's right of access to court records, the party seeking secrecy has appointed itself the final decision-maker.

Step four: no court will say who decides. Meanwhile, the jurisdictional picture is a hall of mirrors. Apple's position, filed publicly (Dkt. 406), is that the district court retains jurisdiction to "supervise" the filing of redacted versions — but cannot actually adjudicate anything about the redactions, because the orders are on appeal. The district court's latest order (Dkt. 407) sets a deadline for the meet and confer and says disagreements should go to the magistrate judge — while noting that whether the magistrate or the district judge would even have jurisdiction over such a dispute "may turn on the specifics of the issue." So: the redactions must be worked out now; the court that issued the orders won't construe them; the party that benefits from secrecy claims final decision authority; and the question of which judge could review any of it is expressly unresolved.

The result is a system with no adult in the room — except the one with the trillion-dollar market cap. My position, stated to Apple in writing, is simple: I am not the arbiter of Apple's redactions and I will not pretend to be. The burden of justifying secrecy belongs to Apple at every stage. Apple can file whatever redacted versions it believes it can justify, those choices will be Apple's alone, and the Ninth Circuit can review what this process actually produced.

The appeal isn't about hurt feelings over process. The orders are wrong under multiple independent bodies of law, any one of which requires reversal.

The public-access doctrine. Court records are the public's records. Under Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006), sealing anything more than tangentially related to the merits requires "compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings" — and conclusory assertions of harm don't count. Foltz v. State Farm, 331 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2003), requires a particularized showing as to specific documents; blanket designations under a stipulated protective order prove nothing. An order that seals a thousand pages in their entirety on the strength of a one-sentence category, with no document-specific findings, inverts every element of this doctrine. The months-long fight over what the order even covers is itself the proof: an order that complied with Kamakana would have answered that question on its face.

Improper delegation of a judicial function. Deciding what the public may see in a court file is a judicial act requiring judicial findings. What has happened here instead is that the court issued a category and left the interested corporate party to determine, unilaterally and after the fact, what the order sealed — with Apple declaring in writing that it will make the "final decision" on each redaction. Whatever else that is, it is not an Article III court administering the public's right of access. The redacted documents that eventually appear on the docket will have been scoped entirely by the party that sought the secrecy, with no judicial review of a single specific redaction. That structural defect infects every redaction regardless of its content.

Prior restraint. The order doesn't just seal documents — it commands me to "de-publish" material I already published about my own case. An injunction forbidding and unwinding speech is a prior restraint, which comes to any court "bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Prior restraints are the most disfavored remedy in American law, tolerated only in the most extraordinary circumstances, on the most specific findings. There are no such findings here — there couldn't be, when the order doesn't even specify what content it reaches.

Labor law. The sealed filings are, at their core, an employee's complaints about her working conditions and her employer's conduct — the heartland of activity protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. And California has spoken directly to this: the Silenced No More Act (Code of Civil Procedure § 1001; Government Code § 12964.5) embodies the state's explicit public policy against instruments that restrict workers from discussing unlawful workplace conduct. Orders that operate to gag an employee-plaintiff's accounts of her workplace disputes sit in direct tension with both federal labor law and California's declared policy — a tension the orders never acknowledge, let alone resolve.

Public records cannot be secret. Among the sealed filings is a Request for Judicial Notice composed of public records. Information already in the public domain cannot satisfy any sealing standard, under any test, in any circuit. That entire documents of this character have now spent months under seal tells you everything about how much scrutiny the sealing requests actually received.
What happens nextOn my side: the district-court process is complete. I initiated the court-ordered meet and confer, pursued it for over a month, proposed a concrete protocol with deadlines, and asked Apple to state the basis for its redactions. Apple declined. I have stated my final position and reserved everything for appeal. Apple will file its redacted versions; whatever it chooses to black out, it chose alone.

Then it goes to the Ninth Circuit, where the opening brief in the sealing appeal is due this fall, and where the questions finally get asked in the right order: What, specifically, was found to be sealable? By whom? On what evidence? And who gave a litigant the power to decide what the public may read in a public court file?

I'll post the briefs when they're filed. The full docket, including every order discussed above, is public on CourtListener.

— Ashley M. Gjøvik

Recent federal judicial decisions in Gjovik v. Apple Inc. (3:23-cv-04597, Northern District of California) represent a systematic judicial assault on federal environmental enforcement authority and constitutional due process protections. Through procedural manipulation disguised as case management, the defendant (Apple) and District Judge (Judge Edward Chen) created a framework that effectively immunizes corporate polluters from toxic tort liability while denying citizens fundamental constitutional rights. These decisions threaten to undermine decades of environmental protection law and federal enforcement capabilities. The implications of these decisions extend far beyond a single case, establishing precedent that could effectively eliminate private enforcement of environmental violations while creating procedural mechanisms for corporate defendants to escape liability through systematic rule manipulation.

​The timeline also reveals the decision's direct conflict with federal enforcement priorities. After plaintiff's investigation revealed potential violations at Apple's semiconductor facility, her June 2023 EPA complaint triggered federal enforcement investigation at the site. The EPA's response validates that plaintiff's concerns warranted regulatory attention (precisely the type of citizen enforcement mechanism Congress intended to encourage through environmental statutes). Chen's decision penalizes the thorough investigation that led to federal enforcement action, essentially ruling that plaintiff should have filed suit before conducting the due diligence that revealed actionable violations and prompted EPA intervention.

On May 20 2024, Chen ruled on a Motion to Dismiss and decided to allow Gjovik's environmental claims to move forward. Then, despite previously approving the claims, on October 1 2024, Chen dismissed the same environmental claims with leave to amend, specifically instructing Gjovik to plead "inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence." Then, on February 27 2025, after Gjovik amended as instructed, Chen dismissed the same claims with prejudice using an entirely different legal standard based on judicial notice of public documents.

In response to Apple's fifth 12(b)(6) motion, Chen took judicial notice of Apple's own regulatory documents and then made factual determinations about what "reasonable inquiry" would have reveal and what that inquiry would have consisted of. Chen then also resolved disputed questions about reasonable diligence without testimony or discovery, and concluded any factual conflict in pleadings with deference to the defendant's unsubstantial claims. Chen also denied the plaintiff the right to develop factual records on questions traditionally reserved for juries. 

Chen's use of judicial notice transforms regulatory filings from compliance documentation into litigation weapons. Corporate defendants can now attach their own permits and emission reports to motions to dismiss, arguing these documents establish liability notice regardless of content or interpretation complexity.  Chen's reasoning would also eliminate discovery rule protection for anyone living near industrial facilities.

​This circumvents normal discovery processes where federal agencies could provide context about regulatory compliance, violations, and enforcement priorities. The procedure denies federal prosecutors potential cooperation from private litigants who might develop evidence useful in criminal enforcement actions. By cutting off civil discovery, Chen's approach limits the factual development that often supports federal prosecutions. Worse, he made this decision while knowing the US EPA was investigating Apple's activities at this site and he also refused to take notice of the plaintiff's request for Judicial Notice with those federal public records. 

​Chen identified that CERCLA § 9658 preempts state discovery rules for toxic exposure cases. However, his application fundamentally misinterprets federal policy. The provision exists to ensure adequate time for complex environmental investigations; not to accelerate dismissals based on industrial permit availability. Chen's reasoning converts federal preemption from a plaintiff protection into a corporate shield, inverting Congressional intent to provide adequate investigation time for environmental claims.

Chen's implicit reasoning also creates discriminatory limitation periods based on technical knowledge. This is a particularly problematic precedent for environmental enforcement. This professional expertise penalty would deter environmental professionals from residing near industrial areas and discourage the technical knowledge crucial for environmental enforcement. Under this framework:

• EPA employees living near industrial facilities face shortened limitation periods
• Environmental consultants must proactively investigate nearby operations
• Engineers and scientists bear investigation duties beyond those of other citizens

These standards make environmental protection impossible by requiring either universal technical expertise or prophylactic litigation based on the mere existence of permitted industrial activity.

​Chen also applied the 2-year toxic exposure statute (§ 340.8) while completely ignoring the 3-year property damage statute (§ 338(b)) that would have protected Gjovik's property damage claims. This selective statute application demonstrates systematic bias toward the shortest possible limitations period and is not supported by existing law or public policy.

Further, Chen entertained Apple's successive motion based on speculative "judicial economy" concerns arising out of the expectation that Apple would engage in Rambo litigation. Chen even acknowledged that Rule 12(g)(2) "does lend support to Ms. Gjovik's position,"  but proceeded anyways. This reasoning nullifies Rule 12(g)(2) entirely by allowing defendants to always claim future filing opportunities, and to reward them for litigation misconduct. He further justified his actions post hoc by claiming he was able to find more claims he could dismiss at his discretion (not on the merits), which is not the legal standard. 

The plaintiff objected to these issues, and catastrophic legal implications, in her filings and during oral arguments. Apple's legal counsel consisted exclusively of Big Law employment litigation defense counsel, including multiple partners specialized in defending large corporations from retaliation and discrimination claims, and did not include any environmental attorneys. Apple's counsel also affirmatively told the court that Apple was not under investigation for environmental issues at the site, when Apple was under active US EPA investigation and enforcement. 

The impact of Chen's decision specifically eliminates the discovery rule for private tort remedies and incentivizes defendants to engage in criminal obstruction until the statute of limitations expires. This also creates a bifurcated enforcement system where, upon successful concealment by the defendant, environmental violations can only be addressed through federal citizen suit mechanisms with limited injunctive relief, not through state tort law with damages liability. This bifurcation reduces deterrent effects by eliminating corporate financial liability while preserving only prospective equitable remedies, and requiring uncompensated labor by victims to enforce and obtain financial penalties to be charged against wrong-doers, but only paid to the U.S. Treasury. 

Judge Chen also dismissed the plaintiff's environmental tort claims as time-barred while simultaneously allowing her crime victim retaliation claims to proceed, while both are based on the overlapping and related misconduct by Apple Inc. The same judge who created multiple unconstitutional loopholes to shield Apple from tort liability also found that Apple's conduct appeared to present a strong enough case for criminal charges, as to support Labor Code protections for crime victims arising out of the same facts.

At the same time, Chen also refused to acknowledge plaintiff's arguments that during the same time period that Apple claims she should have discovered their activities, Apple was actively retaliating against her, engaged in criminal witness intimidation and tampering, attempted to coerce her into an undervalued settlement of all claims while concealing what they did to her and prior to firing her, Apple made false and misleading statements to her and the government about their activities at the facility, and that she has inherent claims to crime victim restitution regardless of the form of the cause of action.

​Chen did not even address these arguments and his decision implies that even if an employee is a victim of criminal environmental conduct by their employer, that employer can avoid claims about the underlying harms through otherwise criminal retaliation, harassment, and obstruction in order to conceal their misconduct until the expiration of the statute of limitations.
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The Ninth Circuit's repeated refusal to review final judgments on these dismissed environmental claims also violates established appellate jurisdiction principles while creating complete procedural blockade for pro se crime victims. Constitutional violations become unreviewable while precedent harmful to private environmental rights becomes entrenched. This appellate denial particularly harms federal enforcement interests by preventing correction of decisions that undermine private environmental rights that complement federal enforcement capabilities.

Chen's framework provides corporate defendants with a replicable strategy for escaping environmental liability, even if they did not engage in the same earlier criminal conduct and cover-up that Apple did:

1. File successive motions to dismiss despite procedural waivers
2. Attach own regulatory compliance documents and seek judicial notice
3. Argue document availability equals liability notice regardless of content
4. Force impossible pleading standards on complex liability theories
5. Secure dismissal with prejudice and fight any attempt to appeal 

This framework threatens to eliminate any statute of limitations tolling for private environmental tort liability from any industrial facility with public regulatory filings. It also invites corporate defendants to undertake the same witness intimidation and obstruction that Apple did, in order to prevent victims from filing claims prior to the expiration of statute of limitations.

Federal agencies should clarify that regulatory filing availability does not create immunity from private tort liability for environmental violations. EPA should issue guidance clarifying that citizen investigation and complaint processes support federal enforcement authority, and that the federal discovery rule preempts Chen's rogue decision. Federal prosecutors should also prioritize cases involving facilities where citizen complaints have been dismissed under similar reasoning to demonstrate federal commitment to environmental protection. ENRD should consider amicus briefing in any future cases or appeals under Chen's theories, in order to clarify federal enforcement priorities and preemption scope.

Gjovik v. Apple Inc. represents systematic judicial nullification of private environmental rights through Apple's procedural manipulation. Chen's framework threatens to eliminate tolling for private tort liability and serves as a warning that a well-resourced defendant's sophisticated and malicious case management strategy can sabotage entire statutes. Federal intervention is necessary to prevent this precedent from destroying private environmental remedies that support broader enforcement goals, to provide essential deterrent effects against corporate environmental violations, and to hold Apple and their counsel accountable for making these bad faith arguments and obstructing an appeal that could have corrected this untenable and catastrophic outcome.

​-Ashley 

Published: August 24 2025

Today, I filed two significant documents with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, marking critical steps in my ongoing fight for accountability, justice, and transparency against Apple Inc.

Request for Judicial Notice

In response to Apple's recent Opposition filings filled with factual inaccuracies, I submitted a detailed Request for Judicial Notice. This filing requests the Court officially acknowledge public documents, government agency records, third-party media reports, and formal complaints that indisputably validate my claims of whistleblower retaliation, unlawful surveillance, environmental violations, and systemic procedural abuse.

These materials—including extensive reporting by the Financial Times, investigative findings by EPA, and international inquiries from data protection agencies—are not merely evidence; they fundamentally rebuke Apple's attempts to deny the legitimacy of my disclosures and retaliatory experiences. Judicial notice ensures the court recognizes the reality of my situation, countering Apple's misleading narratives.

Reply in Support of Emergency Injunctive Relief

Simultaneously, I filed my Reply in Support of Emergency Injunctive Relief. This filing underscores the urgency of immediate judicial intervention to halt Apple's retaliatory litigation tactics. Apple's repeated procedural abuses—including threats of contempt, unjust gag orders, and suppression of evidence—have turned litigation into a mechanism of coercion, threatening not only my rights but the broader public interest in transparency and accountability.

In my reply, I outlined specific, targeted relief measures, asking the Court to:

• Stay further oppressive discovery until the appeal resolves.
• Bar Apple from enforcing retaliatory contempt threats related to protected disclosures.
• Accelerate adjudication, urging the district court to proceed swiftly to a summary judgment or trial to promptly resolve key claims of retaliation.

The stakes here extend beyond my individual case. Apple's tactics threaten all whistleblowers and crime victims who rely on courts as a refuge from retaliation, obstruction, and procedural manipulation.

Why This Matters

These filings are not just procedural steps. They're about reclaiming the integrity of legal processes, protecting whistleblower rights, and ensuring corporate accountability. Every motion, every reply, every document I submit is a step toward transparency, justice, and systemic change.
Thank you for your continued support as I fight not only for my rights but for the rights of all who dare to speak truth to power

View the docket here.

Narrative Is My Legal Training: How I Fought Back Against Apple’s Procedural Blitz — And Why That Filing Was Never Just About the Rules

​On May 14, 2025, Apple filed a late-night (May 15 2025 12:29 AM EST) omnibus motion in the Ninth Circuit — a procedural grenade wrapped in the language of urgency. They moved to strike my appellate brief. They moved to strike my declarations. They moved to compel sealed materials I hadn’t even had a chance to discuss with the Court. And they asked the Court to rule on all of it within 24 to 48 hours. This wasn’t about formatting. It wasn’t about rules. It was about erasing the record, neutralizing the whistleblower, and turning the Court into a gatekeeper of silence.

I’m a pro se litigant. I’m disabled. I’m a whistleblower, witness, and victim. And I did what I’ve always done: I responded — not with power, but with clarity. I filed a 35-page omnibus response supported by law, fact, and my own legal training — the kind that’s based not in courtroom warfare, but in narrative, justice, and survival.

What They Tried to Do
In a single motion, Apple asked the Court to:

• Strike my entire appellate brief because the formatting may have exceeded the word count;
• Strike my declarations in support of my motion for injunction, claiming they were “late”;
• Compel me to disclose sealed, confidential materials, including communications with federal law enforcement and documentation of medical and financial hardship;
• and fast-track all of this before their opposition deadline, giving me just hours to respond.

What they didn’t say in that motion — but what matters deeply — is that they refused to confer with me days earlier. When I offered to discuss the declarations, they informed me nothing was due and there was no appeal. When I offered to stipulate, they refused to engage. And then they filed a midnight three-party motion claiming that because the declarations were filed seven days after my Motion, that they need a thirty day extension. They also claimed that my previously-not-due declarations for the non-existent appeal are actually late and should be stricken. They also claimed I filed hundreds of pages of new exhibits that are overwhelming and delaying them.

What I Filed in Response

I didn’t file three motions. I filed one. I responded to all three of Apple’s demands — overnight — in a single, consolidated brief. I explained:

• That there is no rule requiring declarations to be filed the same day as a brief;
• That the materials they called “new” were in fact mostly already on the district court docket — and many were written by Apple itself (ie, Apple complained to the court about having to read its own privilege log and OSHA filings);
• That the brief they called overlength was filed in good faith, on time, under pressure, and with clear offers to cure;
• That the sealed materials had been redacted and served, and protected by law.

I laid out what Apple never wanted the Court to see: the pattern. The control. The contradictions.

What I Was Actually Trained to Do

Apple wants the Court to see me as a stealth attorney — someone with a J.D. who's “gaming the system.” That’s not just false. It’s upside down. I hold a law degree, but I have never practiced litigation. I’ve never worked in a courtroom. I’ve never taken a deposition. My lowest grades in law school were in civil procedure, evidence, and legal writing — because those courses were designed for adversarial systems I was never drawn to.

What did I study?

• Transitional Justice at Oxford — with former international war crime tribunal staff.
• Restorative Justice, Human Rights Law, Public Health Law, Labor Law, and Administrative Law.
• A 300+ page independent research project on Hawaiian sovereignty and land return, supervised by my Property Law professor.
• A semester as a refugee caseworker, building asylum narratives for people fleeing torture and persecution.

That is the law I was trained in. Not litigation. Not striking. Not silencing. Telling the truth in a way that survives.

They Tried to Gag Me — Then Made me Bleed

This week, in the district court, Apple asked for a protective order to silence me — to restrict my ability to speak publicly about their conduct. Then, in the Ninth Circuit, they asked the Court to force me to disclose sealed materials — including:

• My credit report and financial statements,
• And details about federal criminal investigations into Apple and another institution. 

I redacted what I could. I served what I had to. I filed a public declaration because I had no choice. And then I went online and deleted references from my own LinkedIn — because their demand for disclosure had real-world consequences.

They tried to gag me. Then they tried to make me bleed in public. And all of it was framed as “procedure.”

There was no team of lawyers behind this filing. No paralegal. No funding. Just me. I worked nonstop all night. I broke it into sections. I backed it with law. I disclosed my law school transcript. I cited trauma research. I admitted mistakes. I told the truth — in the format they demanded, but in the language I was trained to speak.

They wanted to control the narrative. I reclaimed it.

Final Thoughts

Apple views me as a threat — to their reputation, to their procedures, to their control over the facts. But the truth is simpler:

• I’m a whistleblower. I’m disabled. I’m alone. And I’m telling the truth.
• I wasn’t trained to win. I was trained to bear witness.
• And I’m still here.

​- Ashley 

The full appellate docket is here.

Read Apple's Motion here. 

Read my response here & below: 

On May 7, 2025, I filed a motion for injunction pending appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Gjovik v. Apple. The motion seeks immediate protection from further discovery and litigation conduct by Apple Inc. while my appeal is pending, particularly in light of serious issues involving crime victims' rights, retaliation, and ongoing constitutional and statutory violations.

This motion follows the district court’s dismissal of claims involving racketeering (RICO), toxic exposure, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) and California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). My appeal challenges, among other things, the court’s denial of injunctive relief sought under the CVRA and UCL.

Pending that appeal, I am now seeking interim protection under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a)(2) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), which allow courts to preserve the status quo during an interlocutory appeal. I have also invoked 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), which expressly provides victims of federal crimes the right to seek immediate relief from a court when their rights are being denied.

The motion outlines how Apple’s current conduct—particularly discovery demands seeking trauma-related medical records, witness information, and other invasive inquiries—poses an immediate risk of irreparable harm, including retraumatization and unlawful retaliation against a federally protected whistleblower and crime victim.

The legal grounds for the injunction include:

• The CVRA, which provides crime victims the right to be reasonably protected from the accused and to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect;
• Marsy’s Law, under Article I, § 28 of the California Constitution, which mirrors those protections at the state level;
• 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512, 1513, 1514, and related provisions prohibiting witness tampering and retaliation;
• Established Ninth Circuit precedent confirming that injunctions are appropriate to prevent coercion or procedural abuse.

The relief requested is narrow: to temporarily stay discovery and related retaliation until the Ninth Circuit rules on the underlying appeal, which directly raises these protective issues.

This case raises significant questions regarding the intersection of corporate retaliation, discovery abuse, and statutory rights afforded to crime victims and whistleblowers. Allowing discovery to proceed in this context—while the lawfulness of that discovery is on direct review—would not only risk further harm to the Appellant, but also contravene the statutory mandates of the CVRA and undermine the integrity of the appellate process.

This motion is not about delay; it is about ensuring that litigation does not become a tool of continued intimidation or retaliation. It is also about enforcing clear and enforceable rights guaranteed to victims under federal and state law.

The Ninth Circuit docket is here: 
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/69805803/gjovik-v-apple-inc/

A copy of the motion is directly available here:

On May 6, 2025, I filed my Opening Brief with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Gjovik v. Apple Inc., Case No. 25-2028. The brief challenges the district court’s dismissal of multiple federal and state claims involving post-employment retaliation, environmental exposure, civil rights violations, and corporate racketeering activity.

The appeal challenges both the district court’s denial of injunctive relief and its dismissal with prejudice of claims brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the California Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200), California’s Bane and Ralph Civil Rights Acts, common law torts, and state and federal toxic tort theories.

The complaint arises from Apple’s retaliatory conduct following my protected disclosures to government agencies, including federal environmental authorities and law enforcement. This appeal arises from a complex action concerning Apple’s alleged pattern of unlawful conduct following my termination, including threats, harassment, reputational interference, and concealment of toxic exposures at one of its semiconductor sites.

The central legal issues on appeal involve both procedural and substantive errors committed at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, as well as the district court’s refusal to grant leave to amend or to issue injunctive relief protecting crime victim rights under federal and state law. The brief seeks reversal and remand on several grounds, including:

• Denial of Injunctive Relief Under § 17200 and the CVRA:: The district court erred in denying interim and permanent injunctive relief under California’s Unfair Competition Law and the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771, despite Gjovik’s allegations of ongoing retaliation, intimidation, and witness interference—all in violation of clear statutory rights afforded to whistleblowers and crime victims. The complaint included substantial documentation of physical harm, economic injury, and retaliatory acts directed at silencing the plaintiff, including threats of litigation, exposure of private materials, and SWATing.
• ​Improper Dismissal of RICO Claims Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), (c), (d): Gjovik alleged a pattern of racketeering activity supported by predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, witness tampering (§ 1512), retaliation (§ 1513), and obstruction of justice—all in service of Apple’s ongoing scheme to conceal toxic exposures and retaliate against whistleblowers. The brief challenges the district court’s failure to analyze the predicate acts in detail and its legally erroneous conclusion that these acts could not form the basis of a viable civil RICO claim at the pleading stage.
• Rejection of California Statutory Claims (Bane Act, Ralph Act): The lower court summarily dismissed California civil rights claims despite evidence of coercive, retaliatory conduct explicitly aimed at suppressing protected disclosures and deterring participation in state and federal proceedings. The district court improperly applied heightened pleading standards and disregarded factual allegations consistent with established precedent under both the Bane and Ralph Acts.
• Dismissal of Toxic Tort Claims Based on Statute of Limitations. The court dismissed Gjovik’s environmental exposure claims by misapplying the statute of limitations and rejecting the discovery rule, despite clear allegations that Apple concealed the presence of hazardous materials and the plaintiff only became aware of the cause of her injuries in 2023. The brief argues that the limitations period was tolled due to fraudulent concealment, and that the underlying factual record supports application of the discovery rule as a matter of law. ​
• Abuse of Discretion in Denying Leave to Amend: The district court dismissed multiple claims with prejudice and without allowing amendment—contrary to Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), and Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) —despite Plaintiff never having amended her complaint and providing detailed proffers of additional facts.
• The brief underscores that courts in the Ninth Circuit must apply “extreme liberality” in favor of amendment, particularly where allegations involve evolving discovery, systemic concealment, and complex statutory claims. The factual record includes documented retaliation, reputational interference, attempted sextortion, and concealment of hazardous industrial emissions at Apple facilities, including toxic byproducts from semiconductor fabrication. These allegations are supported by federal complaints, internal communications, and related investigative disclosures.

This appeal implicates important legal and policy questions regarding:

• The scope of protection afforded to whistleblowers and federal crime victims under the CVRA and Marsy’s Law; The use of discovery and litigation procedure as tools of retaliation;
• The limits of corporate immunity where there is evidence of ongoing fraud, harassment, and environmental concealment;
• And the procedural safeguards required when a plaintiff alleges ongoing harm arising from unlawful enterprise conduct.

This appeal presents issues of first impression in the Ninth Circuit concerning the application of crime victim rights in civil proceedings, the scope of post-employment retaliation as a basis for RICO liability, and the limits of judicial discretion in denying leave to amend complex statutory claims involving concealed harm. It also raises critical questions about the use of discovery and protective orders in cases involving active retaliation, surveillance, and obstruction of protected disclosures.

The case implicates ongoing public policy concerns at the intersection of corporate accountability, environmental compliance, and whistleblower protection. The factual allegations are supported by contemporaneous disclosures to multiple government agencies and are consistent with broader federal enforcement actions in related contexts.

Procedural Status and Next Steps
The Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 1292(a)(1). In parallel with this appeal, Appellant has filed a Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal seeking to stay discovery and other retaliatory litigation conduct pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(2) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). That motion remains pending before the Court. Apple’s responsive brief is due in accordance with the scheduling order, after which Appellant will submit a reply brief. All filings, including the Opening Brief and Injunction Motion, are available at: ​ https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/69805803/gjovik-v-apple-inc/

​This appeal seeks to vindicate the rights of whistleblowers, ensure accountability for environmental and retaliatory misconduct, and affirm that procedural doctrines must not be used to shield unlawful corporate behavior from judicial scrutiny.

- Ashley 


The Ninth Circuit docket is here: 
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/69805803/gjovik-v-apple-inc/

A copy of the brief is directly available here:

Today, I’m reporting on Apple’s latest procedural maneuvering in my ongoing appeal before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Unsurprisingly, Apple has filed a flurry of motions attempting to stall or dismiss my appeal, despite the Court already setting a briefing schedule and my case moving forward.

Apple filed:

• A Motion to Stay or Dismiss the Appeal, arguing that my appeal is "premature" because the district court has not yet ruled on Rule 54(b) certification​.
• Oppositions to my motions seeking clarification on the briefing schedule​.
• Opposition to my motion to consolidate my related appeals for efficiency​.

However, in my Omnibus Opposition filed today, I exposed Apple’s contradictory litigation strategy — and I want to share the highlights with you.

What Apple Is Arguing

Apple claims that:

• The Ninth Circuit does not yet have jurisdiction over my case because not all district court claims were finalized.
• They want the appellate court to either pause (stay) the case or throw it out entirely​.

This, of course, directly conflicts with their earlier arguments in the district court, where they insisted the dismissed claims were irrelevant and closed — to avoid discovery obligations and responding to my evidence requests​.

My Response

In my Omnibus Opposition, I detailed how Apple is:

• Contradicting itself across courts: In district court, Apple argued my dismissed claims were final and irrelevant to avoid producing discovery. In the appellate court, they now claim those same claims are "not final" to block my appeal.
• Engaging in procedural harassment: Apple flooded the court with over 1,500 pages of duplicative attachments — much of which was already in the record — violating Ninth Circuit rules that prohibit excessive and unnecessary filings​.
• Creating a procedural paradox: Apple wants the claims to be both final (to dodge discovery) and not final (to avoid appeal). In my filing, I described this as Apple creating a “logical loop” that collapses under scrutiny. As I wrote: “Apple’s argument requires claims to exist in mutually exclusive states — an infinite loop of contradictory conditions with no resolution.”​

I even included a diagram illustrating Apple’s self-contradictory litigation posture, highlighting how their argument logically collapses — or as I aptly put it, Apple’s litigation position is "like Schrödinger’s cat: simultaneously alive and dead."​

What Happens Next

Despite Apple’s attempt to derail the process, the Ninth Circuit already issued a briefing schedule:

• May 6, 2025: My Opening Brief due
• June 5, 2025: Apple’s Response due

Apple’s motion to stay or dismiss the appeal will be decided by the Court, but meanwhile, I will continue preparing my Opening Brief.

Stay tuned — I will keep fighting for accountability, and I will not allow procedural gamesmanship to derail the truth.

You can read the filings here:

• Apple’s Motion to Stay or Dismiss Appeal
• Apple’s Response to Motion to Consolidate
• Apple’s Response to Motion for Clarification
• My Omnibus Opposition to Apple’s Motions

Follow the full case docket here: Gjovik v. Apple Inc. (9th Circuit Docket)

For real-time updates, follow along on Twitter, Mastodon, or BlueSky.

This March, I officially opened an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to challenge the dismissal of critical claims in my lawsuit against Apple Inc. — claims that include environmental violations, whistleblower retaliation, and toxic tort injuries. This marks a significant next chapter in my fight for accountability.

The appellate case is docketed under Gjovik v. Apple Inc., Nos. 24-6058 & 25-2028. After Apple's attempts to have portions of my case dismissed on procedural grounds, I’m now taking these issues to the federal appellate court for review.
​
In my filings, I emphasized several key points:

• I filed a Motion to Consolidate Cases to ensure both active appeals are considered together. Since they arise from the same facts and legal questions, consolidation avoids "fragmented litigation of essentially identical issues," which undermines uniformity and judicial efficiency​.
• Recognizing a pending Rule 54(b) motion in the district court, I filed a Motion for Clarification. I urged the court to confirm its authority to review finality independently and sought guidance on scheduling to avoid unnecessary litigation delays​.
• The Court issued a schedule with my Opening Brief due May 6, 2025, and Apple’s response due June 5, 2025. Optional replies are due within 21 days after Apple's brief​.

Additionally, in my motion, I highlighted that many of the dismissed claims — including those under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Dodd-Frank Act, and California civil rights statutes — were fully and finally resolved at the district level. Therefore, they are ripe for appellate review.  Apple, in its arguments, had even acknowledged these dismissed claims as legally and factually distinct from other ongoing issues, which reinforces my position that appellate review at this stage is both appropriate and necessary​.

The goal is clear: to prevent fragmented litigation, avoid conflicting rulings, and make sure these vital public interest issues are fully and fairly heard at the appellate level.

You can read the filings here:

• Motion to Consolidate Cases
• Motion for Clarification of Briefing Schedule
• Court’s Docketing Notice & Time Schedule Order

You can follow the full docket here: Gjovik v. Apple Inc. (9th Circuit Docket)

Upcoming dates to watch:

• May 6, 2025: Opening Appellate Brief due
• June 5, 2025: Apple’s Response Brief due
• June 12, 2025: District Court hearing on Rule 54(b) motion (which may affect the appellate posture)

I’m excited to share a significant legal victory in my lawsuit against Apple Inc. On Feb. 27 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued a ruling allowing numerous retaliation claims and labor law violations to move forward, including claims under California whistleblower laws, workplace safety statutes, and employment retaliation protections. The court also confirmed that I can seek special damages (penalties) for many of these claims—an uncommon decision for an individual lawsuit.

You can read the full decision here: Court Decision

In a landmark decision, the court ruled that my retaliation claim under California’s Crime Victim Protections (Labor Code § 230(e)) can proceed. This could be the first lawsuit to successfully invoke crime victim protections in a workplace retaliation case.

The Crime: Apple’s Environmental Violations Nearly Killed Me
At the core of this claim is Apple’s secret semiconductor fabrication facility in Santa Clara, CA. The facility illegally vented hazardous and carcinogenic chemicals into the air near my apartment in 2020, causing severe health issues that nearly killed me. I later discovered that Apple was responsible and had actively concealed its involvement.

When I reported the exposure and began advocating for environmental justice, Apple retaliated against me. They placed me under surveillance, harassed me, obstructed my career, and ultimately fired me. The California Crime Victims laws protect employees from retaliation for reporting violent crimes or cooperating with authorities regarding violent crimes. My case is one of the first to argue that environmental crimes—especially those that endanger human life—fall under these protections.
​
California law recognizes that workplace safety and environmental violations can be criminal offenses (Cal. Penal Code § 387, 6423; Health & Safety Code §§ 42400.3, 42400.5). My argument was simple: Apple nearly killed me, I fought back, and they retaliated against me for it. The court agreed that I have a viable claim.

Another major win in this decision is that the court is allowing special damages (penalties) for Apple’s labor law violations—something usually reserved for enforcement actions by the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) or Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) cases. This means that I, as an individual plaintiff, can seek penalties against Apple for violating whistleblower protections, workplace safety laws, and retaliation prohibitions.

This ruling could set an important precedent for future individual lawsuits against corporate employers. Traditionally, penalties for individual labor violations have been regarded as something the state would enforce, but this decision recognizes the right of individual employees to seek penalties when they have been harmed.

In addition to this major victory, I already have an appeal pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. My existing appeal challenges the lower court’s prior rulings on injunctions, collateral orders, and procedural dismissals of several claims. With this latest decision, my Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) and Toxic Tort claims have now been dismissed with prejudice, meaning they are final and ripe for appeal. This allows me to expand my Ninth Circuit case to challenge the wrongful dismissal of those claims.

These claims are critical because they address Apple’s extreme and outrageous misconduct, including the severe emotional distress I suffered due to Apple’s retaliation, surveillance, harassment, and environmental exposure. The toxic tort claims also hold Apple accountable for the illegal semiconductor fabrication facility that led to my life-threatening chemical exposure in 2020.

This development strengthens my appeal and gives the Ninth Circuit the opportunity to review and overturn these dismissals, ensuring that all of my claims receive the full legal consideration they deserve. Stay tuned for more updates on the ongoing litigation at both the district court and appellate levels!

​Ninth Circuit Case Docket: Gjovik v Apple

This ruling paves the way for trial and further discovery in my case. Apple has been fighting to shut this lawsuit down since day one, filing multiple motions to dismiss and attempting to block evidence. But with each step, the court has reaffirmed the strength of my claims.

As we move forward, I will continue advocating for:
- Corporate accountability for environmental crimes and workplace retaliation
- Stronger legal protections for whistleblowers and crime victims
- Justice for those harmed by Apple’s unlawful practices

I appreciate the support from everyone following this case! Stay tuned for more updates as we push forward.
🔹 Case Docket: CourtListener Docket
🔹 Read the Court Decision: PDF

I had asked the Judge to stay the next amended complaint until the appeal concludes, as I will likely need to re-do and un-do much of the work after the appellate court issues an order. The judge denied my request and said I still have to amend my complaint per his prior decision. I filed the Fifth Amended Complaint on Nov. 7 2024, but made sure I complained about it. You can read it here. 

Fifth Amended Complaint: 

Apple had filed an opposition to my appeal of the U.S. Dept. of Labor toxic waste whistleblower case & reading Apple's response, and having to respond to it, was just as enjoyable as stabbing pencils into my eyes. You can read that here.

I filed my Reply to U.S. Dept. of Labor on Nov. 6 2024, cutting it close at literally midnight - but getting it in. US Dept. of Labor accepted it later that day.

U.S. Dept. of Labor ARB appellate reply:

On Oct. 25 2024, the Judge in the civil lawsuit issued an Order responding to my "am I still in trouble?" motion. He said I can still attend Zoom hearings & his order acknowledges there were internet issues at the last hearing. Read the order here. The motion I filed is here. 

The District Court Judge issued an Order responding to my request for an extension to file my amended complaint (until after he rules on the Motion to Stay) and if not to increase the page limit. He denied my request for both, but then gave me a week extension any ways. His comments about the appeal seem fair, they are uncommon. Read the order here. The motion I filed is here. 

​On Oct. 4 2024, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals docketed my Gjovik v Apple case and issued a scheduling order. 

Docket Number: 24-6058
Originating Case Number: 3:23-cv-04597-EMC
Short Title: Gjovik v. Apple Inc.

Ashley M. Gjovik
Appeal Opening Brief: November 13, 2024

Apple Inc.
Appeal Answering Brief: December 13, 2024

On October 1 2024, the US Court issued a decision in my civil lawsuit, in response to Apple's fourth Motion to Dismiss and third motion to strike. The Court approved six of my claims (including many sub-claims) to move forward to discovery. This includes: Tamney termination in violation of public policy, California Whistleblower Protection Act § 1102.5, Cal. Labor Code §§ 6310 (retaliation for safety activities), 98.6 (retaliation for labor complaints),  232.5 (retaliation for talking about work conditions), and 96k (retaliation for exercising constitutional rights, in furtherance of the labor code, outside of work hours and not on work property). 

The prior May 20 2024 decision had dismissed the Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5 claim entirely but with leave to amend, it was amended, and based on those amendments, in the Oct. 1 2024 decision, six different categories of complaints of unlawful activity were expressly approved to move forward to discovery:

• (1) "violations of the anti-retaliation provisions of environmental laws, specifically, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9610 and 7622 and 15 U.S.C. 2622;
• (2) violation of § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA;
• (3) violation of California General Industry Safety Order 5194;
• (4) violation of 29 U.S.C. § 660;
• (5) violation of the California Constitution’s right to privacy; and
• (6) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and California Government Code § 12920."

In addition, four claims (Cal. Labor Code § 232, private nuisance, IIED-Cancer, & IIED-Outrage) and two requests for penalties (§§ 98.6 & 1102.5) were dismissed with leave to amend. If all amendments were approved, this would raise the total of active claims to ten individual claims from a pro se plaintiff against a corporation following the corporation filing five motions to dismiss. 

The requested penalties are part of a much larger request for damages, and the only issue to be amended is the statute of limitations tolling theory, of which the Court approved. Similarly, private nuisance is only dismissed due to statute of limitations tolling and the Court already approved my theory of tolling for all the toxic torts. The IIED-Cancer claim was dismissed due to the same statute of limitations request, and also on the merits of intent (though this was a misunderstanding by the Court of the intent required for this tort). Finally, the IIED-Outrage claim was also dismissed with leave to amend, only requesting more details on dates, times, and events. 

While it was a huge victory to have six claims approved to move forward to discovery and another four claims granted leave to amend following so many challenges from Apple, the remainder of the decision included several highly prejudicial dismissals based on abuse of discretion and clear error. Many of the claims were dismissed with prejudice (either due to abuse of discretion, or on a clearly erroneous basis), were also important claims for this litigation and it is highly disfavored to dismiss with prejudice any claims that may have merit, as that is essentially removing any remedy for harm even if the evidence later substantiates that claim. Some of the claims dismissed with prejudice already have evidence showing a nexus with the retaliation. Several of the dismissals with prejudice are important to me enough that I would appeal these dismissals at the end of the case anyways, which could require re-doing the whole trial afterwards.

The court asked me to plead several areas that I did plead already in my Second Amended Complaint, and in the rejected surreply brief thing - but he's insisting they be formally added to the complaint. The statute of limitations tolling facts, IIED facts, and retaliation for talking about pay is probably 15-20 pages of additional pleading. In addition, the Court told me I'm not allowed to 'amend' any part of the existing complaint other than what he expressly gave me permission to, but that I also have to keep the complaint at a max of 75 pages. The current complaint is 74 pages. Further, the only way I could have room to plead these claims is if I surrender to his dismissal with prejudice of ultrahazardous activities, Right to Know retaliation, and unfair business practices claims - which could make it much more difficult, or impossible, to appeal later. Finally, for at least one of the claims (IIED-Cancer) he told me I can amend but then essentially threatened me with sanctions if I try to amend - which coerces me to withdraw that claim and I probably would not be able to appeal it later.

Ashley won the appeal of her California unemployment insurance claim on July 14 2022. The Administrative Law Judge wrote: 

"Prior to the filing of the claim for benefits the claimant last work in September of 2021 as a senior engineering program manager at a salary of $169,000 per year. She worked approximately six and a half years for the employer.

The claimant received notice from the vice president that she was being discharged. The notice was vague and incomplete and stated that the claimant had disclosed confidential information and had not fully participated in some investigation. Although the claimant requested specific information from the employer, no specific information was provided.

Prior to the separation of the employment the claimant received great performance reviews and prior to the separation the claimant received no oral or written warning notifying her that job was in jeopardy. At all times the claimant performed her job duties to the best of her ability.....

In this matter the evidence shows that the claimant was discharged for reasons other than misconduct connected with the most recent work. Since the claimant performed her job duties to the best of her ability and had not received warnings putting her on notice that her job was in jeopardy, the claimant was discharged for reasons other than misconduct and she is qualified for benefits under section 1256."

View the decision.