2016 CALIFORNIA DTSC CONSENT AGREEMENT 

In 2016, Apple entered a hazardous waste Consent Agreement with the California EPA over hazardous waste violations at two different Apple facilities in Cupertino and Sunnyvale. The agreement was for at least five years and covered all Apple hazardous waste activities in California. The agreement similarly found that Apple was violating hazardous waste laws under both federal and state laws including many of the same issues at 3250 Scott Blvd including operating without required permits, failing to properly label and mark hazardous waste, and unlawfully transporting hazardous waste without required manifests or records (including unlawfully exporting hazardous waste to other countries). DTSC fined Apple $450,000. 

View the 2016 Complaint, Settlement Agreement, and Announcement. In 2016, Apple's environmental team told Reuters that "This matter involves an oversight in filing paperwork... We've worked... to ensure that going forward we have the proper permits for our current site. As we do with all our facilities, we followed our stringent set of health and safety standards, which go well beyond legal requirements." (See, California EPA says settled with Apple on hazardous waste claims). The Consent Agreement could only be terminated if Apple demonstrated compliance with hazardous waste laws at all of its facilities. At the time Apple was able to obtain a termination of the agreement in 2020, Apple was admittedly in violation of federal hazardous waste laws at 3250 Scott Blvd. If the 2017-2025 RCRA violations had been identified and reported, those violations likely would have prevented the termination of the 2016-2020 California EPA Consent Agreement. 

Please feel free to contact me with any questions or requests for information.

​-Ashley ​

These additions include no names, no dates, no documents, no policy citations, and no context — only broad, conclusory language with no factual grounding.

​Even in its revised “failure to mitigate damages” defense, Apple simply states that it is “currently unaware” of whether I sought other employment and is preserving the defense pending discovery. This defies the Court’s instruction to include some factual basis to justify asserting the defense.
​
You can view the Microsoft Word "diff" of the first and second version here (and excerpt below).

Apple’s filing fails to comply with the Court’s order. Courts require more than legal conclusions — especially after being told exactly what’s missing. Apple appears to have simply copied the Court’s language back into the pleading without supplying the required facts.

The Court’s Prior Instructions:

• “Apple should still provide some concrete allegations… to support the defense.”
• “The Court strikes the defenses only because Apple has not provided concrete facts.”
• “This information is, at least in part, within its possession, custody, or control.”
• “Concrete allegations are needed.”

Yet, Apple’s response simply recites: “Plaintiff disclosed confidential product-related information… failed to cooperate… violated Apple policies…”

That is not compliance — it is deflection. Further, Apple also:

• Continues to allege misconduct without citing any underlying facts;
• Vaguely accuses me of providing “inaccurate and/or incomplete information to government entities and the public” — a veiled claim of perjury, with no support;
• Asserts that I “requested” paid leave — again, with no citation — despite my contemporaneous public statements of the factual basis for the scenario, and federal findings indicating the leave was an unlawful suspension.

If the Court strikes these defenses again:

• Apple loses its "failure to mitigate" defense — meaning they can’t argue I should’ve just “got another job.”
• It loses the “offset” argument — no deduction for imaginary earnings.
• It loses the “unclean hands” and “after-acquired evidence” defenses — no smears, no post hoc justifications.
• And it loses its final procedural weapon — the threat of dragging this out endlessly with vague innuendo.

This narrows the case. It tightens discovery. It makes the damages math simpler. And it removes one of the few remaining litigation levers. And the risk for Apple, if it refuses to resolve this, only compounds.

This amended Answer does not reflect a good-faith attempt to cure pleading deficiencies. It reflects a deliberate retreat from factual litigation altogether.

Apple was given 14 days to revise its defenses after the Court struck them for being conclusory and unsupported. The Court explicitly instructed Apple to plead concrete facts — names, dates, events, documents. Instead, Apple submitted a filing that merely repeats legal conclusions, substitutes the Court’s own illustrative language as if it were factual pleading, and copy-pastes boilerplate text across multiple defenses — likely assembled in under 30 minutes.

This is not a legal defense strategy. It is a procedural maneuver — unusually cautious, and concurrently reckless.
​
Apple has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity for aggressive litigation. It filed nine motions to dismiss, repeatedly sought sanctions, and briefed complex jurisdictional and preemption issues. Since 2023, Apple’s litigation teams have fought my detailed allegations of environmental violations, racketeering, obstruction of justice, and antitrust violations. It is represented by multiple top-tier law firms with national reputations, and its internal legal department rivals most federal agencies. To suggest this filing reflects negligence or inexperience defies credibility.

There is only one plausible explanation for this level of risk aversion: Apple did not want to tie itself to any factual narrative. More specifically, it appears Apple may have been preparing to plead “facts” derived through extrajudicial influence — and was ultimately forced to abandon that plan.

In the days leading up to this filing, I raised concerns — through protected speech and formal agency communications — that Apple appeared to be interfering in parallel government proceedings, seemingly to engineer official findings to then cite in its civil Answer. I notified both government officials and the public (albeit cryptically) that if Apple exploited premature or coordinated agency action to shape its defense, it would face immediate and appropriate legal response from me.

It is now especially notable that Apple’s Answer:

• Makes no reference to new findings;
• Omits mention of any material public facts central to its asserted defenses;
• Affirms no facts it is already on record as knowing; and
• Introduces vague, recycled allegations — while leveling a new, unsubstantiated claim that I “misled government entities and the public.”

This last allegation is not just unsupported — it is reactive. It appears crafted to preemptively deflect from the very type of interference I warned about. This is not coincidence. It is confirmation.

To underscore the point: Apple appeared to have coordinated with a major news outlet to publish a story reinforcing its planned defense narrative — timed to support a position in another proceeding. I became aware of this effort in real time. I contacted the outlet and, in precise legal terms, explained what Apple was doing: attempting to manipulate press coverage to manufacture evidentiary material. The article was pulled. It was never published.

This isn’t the strategy of a company trying to win on the merits. It’s the strategy of a company trying to control the record — and failing.

Containment is not a legal strategy. It’s reputational triage.

And in litigation — where discovery, testimony, and trial timelines exist to surface the truth — triage almost always fails. Apple’s refusal to plead facts is now part of the evidentiary record. Its use of boilerplate in place of fact is part of the litigation history.

If this Answer represents the collapse of a pre-fabricated narrative — forced to detour after exposure or internal panic — then what you’re seeing is not defense strategy: it’s collapse.

​-Ashley​

Diff of Apple's First Answer and Amended Answer:

The full Gjovik v Apple case Docket is here: 
​www.courtlistener.com/docket/67772913/gjovik-v-apple-inc/

Recent federal judicial decisions in Gjovik v. Apple Inc. (3:23-cv-04597, Northern District of California) represent a systematic judicial assault on federal environmental enforcement authority and constitutional due process protections. Through procedural manipulation disguised as case management, the defendant (Apple) and District Judge (Judge Edward Chen) created a framework that effectively immunizes corporate polluters from toxic tort liability while denying citizens fundamental constitutional rights. These decisions threaten to undermine decades of environmental protection law and federal enforcement capabilities. The implications of these decisions extend far beyond a single case, establishing precedent that could effectively eliminate private enforcement of environmental violations while creating procedural mechanisms for corporate defendants to escape liability through systematic rule manipulation.

​The timeline also reveals the decision's direct conflict with federal enforcement priorities. After plaintiff's investigation revealed potential violations at Apple's semiconductor facility, her June 2023 EPA complaint triggered federal enforcement investigation at the site. The EPA's response validates that plaintiff's concerns warranted regulatory attention (precisely the type of citizen enforcement mechanism Congress intended to encourage through environmental statutes). Chen's decision penalizes the thorough investigation that led to federal enforcement action, essentially ruling that plaintiff should have filed suit before conducting the due diligence that revealed actionable violations and prompted EPA intervention.

On May 20 2024, Chen ruled on a Motion to Dismiss and decided to allow Gjovik's environmental claims to move forward. Then, despite previously approving the claims, on October 1 2024, Chen dismissed the same environmental claims with leave to amend, specifically instructing Gjovik to plead "inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence." Then, on February 27 2025, after Gjovik amended as instructed, Chen dismissed the same claims with prejudice using an entirely different legal standard based on judicial notice of public documents.

In response to Apple's fifth 12(b)(6) motion, Chen took judicial notice of Apple's own regulatory documents and then made factual determinations about what "reasonable inquiry" would have reveal and what that inquiry would have consisted of. Chen then also resolved disputed questions about reasonable diligence without testimony or discovery, and concluded any factual conflict in pleadings with deference to the defendant's unsubstantial claims. Chen also denied the plaintiff the right to develop factual records on questions traditionally reserved for juries. 

Chen's use of judicial notice transforms regulatory filings from compliance documentation into litigation weapons. Corporate defendants can now attach their own permits and emission reports to motions to dismiss, arguing these documents establish liability notice regardless of content or interpretation complexity.  Chen's reasoning would also eliminate discovery rule protection for anyone living near industrial facilities.

​This circumvents normal discovery processes where federal agencies could provide context about regulatory compliance, violations, and enforcement priorities. The procedure denies federal prosecutors potential cooperation from private litigants who might develop evidence useful in criminal enforcement actions. By cutting off civil discovery, Chen's approach limits the factual development that often supports federal prosecutions. Worse, he made this decision while knowing the US EPA was investigating Apple's activities at this site and he also refused to take notice of the plaintiff's request for Judicial Notice with those federal public records. 

​Chen identified that CERCLA § 9658 preempts state discovery rules for toxic exposure cases. However, his application fundamentally misinterprets federal policy. The provision exists to ensure adequate time for complex environmental investigations; not to accelerate dismissals based on industrial permit availability. Chen's reasoning converts federal preemption from a plaintiff protection into a corporate shield, inverting Congressional intent to provide adequate investigation time for environmental claims.

Chen's implicit reasoning also creates discriminatory limitation periods based on technical knowledge. This is a particularly problematic precedent for environmental enforcement. This professional expertise penalty would deter environmental professionals from residing near industrial areas and discourage the technical knowledge crucial for environmental enforcement. Under this framework:

• EPA employees living near industrial facilities face shortened limitation periods
• Environmental consultants must proactively investigate nearby operations
• Engineers and scientists bear investigation duties beyond those of other citizens

These standards make environmental protection impossible by requiring either universal technical expertise or prophylactic litigation based on the mere existence of permitted industrial activity.

​Chen also applied the 2-year toxic exposure statute (§ 340.8) while completely ignoring the 3-year property damage statute (§ 338(b)) that would have protected Gjovik's property damage claims. This selective statute application demonstrates systematic bias toward the shortest possible limitations period and is not supported by existing law or public policy.

Further, Chen entertained Apple's successive motion based on speculative "judicial economy" concerns arising out of the expectation that Apple would engage in Rambo litigation. Chen even acknowledged that Rule 12(g)(2) "does lend support to Ms. Gjovik's position,"  but proceeded anyways. This reasoning nullifies Rule 12(g)(2) entirely by allowing defendants to always claim future filing opportunities, and to reward them for litigation misconduct. He further justified his actions post hoc by claiming he was able to find more claims he could dismiss at his discretion (not on the merits), which is not the legal standard. 

The plaintiff objected to these issues, and catastrophic legal implications, in her filings and during oral arguments. Apple's legal counsel consisted exclusively of Big Law employment litigation defense counsel, including multiple partners specialized in defending large corporations from retaliation and discrimination claims, and did not include any environmental attorneys. Apple's counsel also affirmatively told the court that Apple was not under investigation for environmental issues at the site, when Apple was under active US EPA investigation and enforcement. 

The impact of Chen's decision specifically eliminates the discovery rule for private tort remedies and incentivizes defendants to engage in criminal obstruction until the statute of limitations expires. This also creates a bifurcated enforcement system where, upon successful concealment by the defendant, environmental violations can only be addressed through federal citizen suit mechanisms with limited injunctive relief, not through state tort law with damages liability. This bifurcation reduces deterrent effects by eliminating corporate financial liability while preserving only prospective equitable remedies, and requiring uncompensated labor by victims to enforce and obtain financial penalties to be charged against wrong-doers, but only paid to the U.S. Treasury. 

Judge Chen also dismissed the plaintiff's environmental tort claims as time-barred while simultaneously allowing her crime victim retaliation claims to proceed, while both are based on the overlapping and related misconduct by Apple Inc. The same judge who created multiple unconstitutional loopholes to shield Apple from tort liability also found that Apple's conduct appeared to present a strong enough case for criminal charges, as to support Labor Code protections for crime victims arising out of the same facts.

At the same time, Chen also refused to acknowledge plaintiff's arguments that during the same time period that Apple claims she should have discovered their activities, Apple was actively retaliating against her, engaged in criminal witness intimidation and tampering, attempted to coerce her into an undervalued settlement of all claims while concealing what they did to her and prior to firing her, Apple made false and misleading statements to her and the government about their activities at the facility, and that she has inherent claims to crime victim restitution regardless of the form of the cause of action.

​Chen did not even address these arguments and his decision implies that even if an employee is a victim of criminal environmental conduct by their employer, that employer can avoid claims about the underlying harms through otherwise criminal retaliation, harassment, and obstruction in order to conceal their misconduct until the expiration of the statute of limitations.
​
The Ninth Circuit's repeated refusal to review final judgments on these dismissed environmental claims also violates established appellate jurisdiction principles while creating complete procedural blockade for pro se crime victims. Constitutional violations become unreviewable while precedent harmful to private environmental rights becomes entrenched. This appellate denial particularly harms federal enforcement interests by preventing correction of decisions that undermine private environmental rights that complement federal enforcement capabilities.

Chen's framework provides corporate defendants with a replicable strategy for escaping environmental liability, even if they did not engage in the same earlier criminal conduct and cover-up that Apple did:

1. File successive motions to dismiss despite procedural waivers
2. Attach own regulatory compliance documents and seek judicial notice
3. Argue document availability equals liability notice regardless of content
4. Force impossible pleading standards on complex liability theories
5. Secure dismissal with prejudice and fight any attempt to appeal 

This framework threatens to eliminate any statute of limitations tolling for private environmental tort liability from any industrial facility with public regulatory filings. It also invites corporate defendants to undertake the same witness intimidation and obstruction that Apple did, in order to prevent victims from filing claims prior to the expiration of statute of limitations.

Federal agencies should clarify that regulatory filing availability does not create immunity from private tort liability for environmental violations. EPA should issue guidance clarifying that citizen investigation and complaint processes support federal enforcement authority, and that the federal discovery rule preempts Chen's rogue decision. Federal prosecutors should also prioritize cases involving facilities where citizen complaints have been dismissed under similar reasoning to demonstrate federal commitment to environmental protection. ENRD should consider amicus briefing in any future cases or appeals under Chen's theories, in order to clarify federal enforcement priorities and preemption scope.

Gjovik v. Apple Inc. represents systematic judicial nullification of private environmental rights through Apple's procedural manipulation. Chen's framework threatens to eliminate tolling for private tort liability and serves as a warning that a well-resourced defendant's sophisticated and malicious case management strategy can sabotage entire statutes. Federal intervention is necessary to prevent this precedent from destroying private environmental remedies that support broader enforcement goals, to provide essential deterrent effects against corporate environmental violations, and to hold Apple and their counsel accountable for making these bad faith arguments and obstructing an appeal that could have corrected this untenable and catastrophic outcome.

​-Ashley 

Published: August 24 2025

I’m excited to share a significant legal victory in my lawsuit against Apple Inc. On Feb. 27 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued a ruling allowing numerous retaliation claims and labor law violations to move forward, including claims under California whistleblower laws, workplace safety statutes, and employment retaliation protections. The court also confirmed that I can seek special damages (penalties) for many of these claims—an uncommon decision for an individual lawsuit.

You can read the full decision here: Court Decision

In a landmark decision, the court ruled that my retaliation claim under California’s Crime Victim Protections (Labor Code § 230(e)) can proceed. This could be the first lawsuit to successfully invoke crime victim protections in a workplace retaliation case.

The Crime: Apple’s Environmental Violations Nearly Killed Me
At the core of this claim is Apple’s secret semiconductor fabrication facility in Santa Clara, CA. The facility illegally vented hazardous and carcinogenic chemicals into the air near my apartment in 2020, causing severe health issues that nearly killed me. I later discovered that Apple was responsible and had actively concealed its involvement.

When I reported the exposure and began advocating for environmental justice, Apple retaliated against me. They placed me under surveillance, harassed me, obstructed my career, and ultimately fired me. The California Crime Victims laws protect employees from retaliation for reporting violent crimes or cooperating with authorities regarding violent crimes. My case is one of the first to argue that environmental crimes—especially those that endanger human life—fall under these protections.
​
California law recognizes that workplace safety and environmental violations can be criminal offenses (Cal. Penal Code § 387, 6423; Health & Safety Code §§ 42400.3, 42400.5). My argument was simple: Apple nearly killed me, I fought back, and they retaliated against me for it. The court agreed that I have a viable claim.

Another major win in this decision is that the court is allowing special damages (penalties) for Apple’s labor law violations—something usually reserved for enforcement actions by the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) or Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) cases. This means that I, as an individual plaintiff, can seek penalties against Apple for violating whistleblower protections, workplace safety laws, and retaliation prohibitions.

This ruling could set an important precedent for future individual lawsuits against corporate employers. Traditionally, penalties for individual labor violations have been regarded as something the state would enforce, but this decision recognizes the right of individual employees to seek penalties when they have been harmed.

In addition to this major victory, I already have an appeal pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. My existing appeal challenges the lower court’s prior rulings on injunctions, collateral orders, and procedural dismissals of several claims. With this latest decision, my Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) and Toxic Tort claims have now been dismissed with prejudice, meaning they are final and ripe for appeal. This allows me to expand my Ninth Circuit case to challenge the wrongful dismissal of those claims.

These claims are critical because they address Apple’s extreme and outrageous misconduct, including the severe emotional distress I suffered due to Apple’s retaliation, surveillance, harassment, and environmental exposure. The toxic tort claims also hold Apple accountable for the illegal semiconductor fabrication facility that led to my life-threatening chemical exposure in 2020.

This development strengthens my appeal and gives the Ninth Circuit the opportunity to review and overturn these dismissals, ensuring that all of my claims receive the full legal consideration they deserve. Stay tuned for more updates on the ongoing litigation at both the district court and appellate levels!

​Ninth Circuit Case Docket: Gjovik v Apple

This ruling paves the way for trial and further discovery in my case. Apple has been fighting to shut this lawsuit down since day one, filing multiple motions to dismiss and attempting to block evidence. But with each step, the court has reaffirmed the strength of my claims.

As we move forward, I will continue advocating for:
- Corporate accountability for environmental crimes and workplace retaliation
- Stronger legal protections for whistleblowers and crime victims
- Justice for those harmed by Apple’s unlawful practices

I appreciate the support from everyone following this case! Stay tuned for more updates as we push forward.
🔹 Case Docket: CourtListener Docket
🔹 Read the Court Decision: PDF

I had asked the Judge to stay the next amended complaint until the appeal concludes, as I will likely need to re-do and un-do much of the work after the appellate court issues an order. The judge denied my request and said I still have to amend my complaint per his prior decision. I filed the Fifth Amended Complaint on Nov. 7 2024, but made sure I complained about it. You can read it here. 

Fifth Amended Complaint: 

On Oct. 25 2024, the Judge in the civil lawsuit issued an Order responding to my "am I still in trouble?" motion. He said I can still attend Zoom hearings & his order acknowledges there were internet issues at the last hearing. Read the order here. The motion I filed is here. 

The District Court Judge issued an Order responding to my request for an extension to file my amended complaint (until after he rules on the Motion to Stay) and if not to increase the page limit. He denied my request for both, but then gave me a week extension any ways. His comments about the appeal seem fair, they are uncommon. Read the order here. The motion I filed is here. 

​On Oct. 4 2024, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals docketed my Gjovik v Apple case and issued a scheduling order. 

Docket Number: 24-6058
Originating Case Number: 3:23-cv-04597-EMC
Short Title: Gjovik v. Apple Inc.

Ashley M. Gjovik
Appeal Opening Brief: November 13, 2024

Apple Inc.
Appeal Answering Brief: December 13, 2024

On October 1 2024, the US Court issued a decision in my civil lawsuit, in response to Apple's fourth Motion to Dismiss and third motion to strike. The Court approved six of my claims (including many sub-claims) to move forward to discovery. This includes: Tamney termination in violation of public policy, California Whistleblower Protection Act § 1102.5, Cal. Labor Code §§ 6310 (retaliation for safety activities), 98.6 (retaliation for labor complaints),  232.5 (retaliation for talking about work conditions), and 96k (retaliation for exercising constitutional rights, in furtherance of the labor code, outside of work hours and not on work property). 

The prior May 20 2024 decision had dismissed the Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5 claim entirely but with leave to amend, it was amended, and based on those amendments, in the Oct. 1 2024 decision, six different categories of complaints of unlawful activity were expressly approved to move forward to discovery:

• (1) "violations of the anti-retaliation provisions of environmental laws, specifically, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9610 and 7622 and 15 U.S.C. 2622;
• (2) violation of § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA;
• (3) violation of California General Industry Safety Order 5194;
• (4) violation of 29 U.S.C. § 660;
• (5) violation of the California Constitution’s right to privacy; and
• (6) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and California Government Code § 12920."

In addition, four claims (Cal. Labor Code § 232, private nuisance, IIED-Cancer, & IIED-Outrage) and two requests for penalties (§§ 98.6 & 1102.5) were dismissed with leave to amend. If all amendments were approved, this would raise the total of active claims to ten individual claims from a pro se plaintiff against a corporation following the corporation filing five motions to dismiss. 

The requested penalties are part of a much larger request for damages, and the only issue to be amended is the statute of limitations tolling theory, of which the Court approved. Similarly, private nuisance is only dismissed due to statute of limitations tolling and the Court already approved my theory of tolling for all the toxic torts. The IIED-Cancer claim was dismissed due to the same statute of limitations request, and also on the merits of intent (though this was a misunderstanding by the Court of the intent required for this tort). Finally, the IIED-Outrage claim was also dismissed with leave to amend, only requesting more details on dates, times, and events. 

While it was a huge victory to have six claims approved to move forward to discovery and another four claims granted leave to amend following so many challenges from Apple, the remainder of the decision included several highly prejudicial dismissals based on abuse of discretion and clear error. Many of the claims were dismissed with prejudice (either due to abuse of discretion, or on a clearly erroneous basis), were also important claims for this litigation and it is highly disfavored to dismiss with prejudice any claims that may have merit, as that is essentially removing any remedy for harm even if the evidence later substantiates that claim. Some of the claims dismissed with prejudice already have evidence showing a nexus with the retaliation. Several of the dismissals with prejudice are important to me enough that I would appeal these dismissals at the end of the case anyways, which could require re-doing the whole trial afterwards.

The court asked me to plead several areas that I did plead already in my Second Amended Complaint, and in the rejected surreply brief thing - but he's insisting they be formally added to the complaint. The statute of limitations tolling facts, IIED facts, and retaliation for talking about pay is probably 15-20 pages of additional pleading. In addition, the Court told me I'm not allowed to 'amend' any part of the existing complaint other than what he expressly gave me permission to, but that I also have to keep the complaint at a max of 75 pages. The current complaint is 74 pages. Further, the only way I could have room to plead these claims is if I surrender to his dismissal with prejudice of ultrahazardous activities, Right to Know retaliation, and unfair business practices claims - which could make it much more difficult, or impossible, to appeal later. Finally, for at least one of the claims (IIED-Cancer) he told me I can amend but then essentially threatened me with sanctions if I try to amend - which coerces me to withdraw that claim and I probably would not be able to appeal it later.

I filed a complaint about Apple's stupid secret fab with the BAAQMD on July 22 2024. 

On August 29 2024, the California Bay Area Air Quality Management District published a formal notice of violations by Apple Inc of two violations of air pollution laws via their Skunkworks fab at 3250 Scott Blvd.

Then on September 12 2024 (probably after an inspection?) BAAQMD cited Apple for four additional violations - 2-1-301 & 2-1-302 again, and also for "gaseous pollution."

Apple apparently violated regulation 2-1-301 when it built/installed equipment that causes air pollution without first getting permission from BAAQMD; then violated -302 by operating the fab for around eight years without required permits.

Then, Apple also violated 9-7-307.1 by dumping illegal amounts of NOx & CO into our air.

​

I filed a complaint about Apple's stupid secret fab with the BAAQMD on July 22 2024. 

On August 29 2024, the California Bay Area Air Quality Management District published formal notice of violations by Apple Inc of two violations of air pollution laws via their Skunkworks fab at 3250 Scott Blvd.

BAAQMD cited Apple for violating local air regulations 2-1-301 & 2-1-302 with their stupid secret fab.

References: 
Link: BAAQMD Regulation 2, Rule 1 - General Requirements 
Link: BAAQMD Notices of Violation
​

2-1-300 STANDARDS

​2-1-301 Authority to Construct: Any person who, after July, 1972, puts in place, builds, erects, installs, modifies, modernizes, alters or replaces any article, machine, equipment or other contrivance, the use of which may cause, reduce or control the emission of air contaminants, shall first secure written authorization from the APCO in the form of an authority to construct. Routine repairs, maintenance, or cyclic maintenance that includes replacement of components with identical components is not considered to be an alteration, modification or replacement for the purpose of this Section unless the APCO determines the changes to be non-routine. The use or operation of the source shall initiate the start-up period in accordance with Section 2- 1-411. (Amended 3/17/82; 10/19/83; 7/17/91; 5/17/00) 

​2-1-302 Permit to Operate: Before any person, as described in Section 2-1-401, uses or operates any article, machine, equipment or other contrivance, the use of which may cause, reduce or control the emission of air contaminants, such person shall first secure written authorization from the APCO in the form of a permit to operate. ​

On May 20 2022 the US Court in the Northern District of California, SF Division, issued a ruling allowing eight of my legal claims against Apple Inc to proceed. Apple had filed a Motion to Dismiss some of my claims (allowing some to stay) and the US Judge only granted Apple's motion for two claims, but allowed eight claims to proceed and provided me leave to amend another seven claims.

The US Judge ok'd the following claims to go forward: Nuisance (toxic tort for silicon fab emissions), Ultrahazardous activities (same), Breach of Good Faith & Fair Dealing, Tamney claim (termination in violation of public policy), Cal. Labor Code § 98.6 (retaliation for labor complaints), § 6310 (retaliation for safety complaints), Cal. B&P Code § 17200 (unfair business practices - injunctive relief against Apple over Gobbler and other user studies), and IIED (fear of cancer due to chemical exposure).

He also granted leave to amend for: RICO 1962(c) and (d), Bane Act, Ralph Act, NIED, Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5, and breach of implied contract (making me no longer an at will employee and can only be fired for cause) -- and also leave to amend to add additional allegations within some of the claims above.  I have until June 17 to file the updated complaint and then Apple has until July 15 2024 to respond.

A Pro Se plaintiff walking out of federal court, in a lawsuit against one of the most powerful companies in the world, after a motion to dismiss, with EIGHT claims intact, and another SEVEN claims which could still be added (so, potentially a total of fifteen viable claims), is extremely unusual. The Judge also allowing leave to amend a RICO claim by a pro se plaintiff is also very unusual - leave to amend is only granted if its possible the claim could be plausible.

I'm pleased with the decision and grateful to finally get my day in court.

The docket is here: 
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67772913/gjovik-v-apple-inc/

The complaint is here: 
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.417952/gov.uscourts.cand.417952.47.0.pdf

The decision is here:
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.417952/gov.uscourts.cand.417952.73.0.pdf

On January 30 2023, the US NLRB issued a Decision of Merit on two of Gjovik's NLRB charges. The charges were filed in October of 2021 and alleged Apple's employee handbook, NDAs, and a threatening email sent by Tim Cook, all violate the NLRA.

View some of the press coverage: 

• TechCrunch, Labor officials found that Apple execs infringed on workers’ rights
• CNN, Apple has infringed on worker rights, NLRB investigators say
• The Register, Watchdog: There just may be something in these claims Apple broke labor laws
• Entrepreneur, 'This Culture Of Secrecy Is Not Okay': Former Apple Employee Celebrates NLRB Decision That It Violated Worker Rights

Ashley won the appeal of her California unemployment insurance claim on July 14 2022. The Administrative Law Judge wrote: 

"Prior to the filing of the claim for benefits the claimant last work in September of 2021 as a senior engineering program manager at a salary of $169,000 per year. She worked approximately six and a half years for the employer.

The claimant received notice from the vice president that she was being discharged. The notice was vague and incomplete and stated that the claimant had disclosed confidential information and had not fully participated in some investigation. Although the claimant requested specific information from the employer, no specific information was provided.

Prior to the separation of the employment the claimant received great performance reviews and prior to the separation the claimant received no oral or written warning notifying her that job was in jeopardy. At all times the claimant performed her job duties to the best of her ability.....

In this matter the evidence shows that the claimant was discharged for reasons other than misconduct connected with the most recent work. Since the claimant performed her job duties to the best of her ability and had not received warnings putting her on notice that her job was in jeopardy, the claimant was discharged for reasons other than misconduct and she is qualified for benefits under section 1256."

View the decision.